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█ Abstract This paper focuses on cases of epistemically transformative experiences, as Paul calls them, cases 
where we have radically different experiences that teach us something we would not have learned other-
wise. Paul raises the new and rather intriguing question of whether epistemic transformative experiences 
pose a general problem for the very possibility of rational decision-making. It is argued that there is an 
important grain of truth in Paul’s set up and solution when it is applied to a certain narrowly defined set 
of cases – choices to have a new taste experience in a safe environment, where no important objective 
values are at stake. But the way she generalizes this approach to large-scale life choices, such as the choice 
to become a parent, is less convincing. Furthermore, given a proper understanding of revelatory value, 
there is no need to reconfigure the agent’s choice situation in order to enable rational decision-making. 
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█ Riassunto La riconfigurazione dei problemi decisionali nell’ottica di Transformative Experiences di L.A. 
Paul – Questo lavoro si concentra sui casi di esperienze epistemicamente trasformative, come le definisce 
Paul, casi in cui abbiamo esperienze radicalmente differenti che ci insegnano qualcosa che non avremmo 
appreso diversamente. Paul solleva una questione nuova e alquanto intrigante, ossia se le esperienze epi-
stemicamente trasformative pongano un problema generale per l’effettiva possibilità della decisione ra-
zionale. Si sosterrà come vi sia un importante elemento di verità nella posizione e nella soluzione di Paul, 
se riferite a un ristretto numero di casi – la scelta di provare una nuova esperienza in un ambiente sicuro, 
dove non sono in gioco valori oggettivamente importanti. E, tuttavia, il modo in cui Paul generalizza que-
sto approccio investendo un vasto ambito di scelte di vita, quali la scelta di diventare genitore, è meno 
convincente. Inoltre, data un’adeguata comprensione di valori rivelativi, non c’è bisogno di riconfigurare 
il contesto di scelta dell’agente per attivare un processo decisionale razionale. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Esperienza trasformativa; Decisione razionale; Valore rivelativo; Valore soggettivo 
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IT IS NOT EASY TO be a decision-maker. So 
many important aspects of our decisions are 
bound to be hidden from informationally 
impoverished agents like us. Uncertainty 
seems therefore inescapable. Orthodox nor-
mative decision theory offers a helping hand 
by providing an account of rational decision-
making under uncertainty. But the uncer-
tainty addressed by this theory is severely 
constrained; it only includes uncertainty 
about the actual state of nature. For example, 
the agent is supposed to know that it will ei-
ther rain or not rain, but she does not know 
which of these two states will occur. The 
agent is not supposed be uncertain about the 
possible states of nature (e.g., that it will ei-
ther rain or not rain), the possible conse-
quences of her actions (e.g., that she gets wet 
if she does not take the umbrella and it rains, 
that she stays dry if she takes the umbrella 
and it rains), the set of actions (e.g., taking 
the umbrella and not taking the umbrella). 
She is also supposed to have determinate 
preferences for all possible consequences 
(e.g., a preference for staying dry over getting 
soaked), and determinate credences (degrees 
of belief) about all possible states of nature 
(e.g., her credence that it will rain is 0.5). 
This limited focus is questioned by a rap-
idly expanding research field in economics 
and decision theory. Instead the aim of this 
research is to elucidate decision making un-
der a more pervasive kind of uncertainty, 
“deep uncertainty” or “severe uncertainty”, 
as it is often called.1 One important kind of 
uncertainty regarding possible consequences 
that has recently been discussed is “aware-
ness of unawareness”, or “conscious una-
wareness”, i.e., cases where the agent is aware 
of significant “blind spots” in her current in-
formation about possible outcomes.2 In these 
cases, she is aware of the possibility that 
some action leads to an outcome that, given 
her currently available information, she does 
not or cannot fully grasp. She also knows that 
these outcomes can make a significant differ-
ence to the desirability of the action. She 
might, for example, consider the possibility 
of new scientific discoveries or new techno-
logical breakthroughs that could be benefi-
cial or harmful given her current aims, with-
out being able to grasp those discoveries and 
breakthroughs. This inability to grasp can be 
due to lack of relevant scientific or techno-
logical knowledge or, more radically, due to 
lack of certain crucial concepts used to de-
scribe these discoveries or breakthroughs. 
Paul’s book could be seen as an important 
contribution to this debate about decision 
making under “awareness of unawareness”, a 
debate that so far has had very little input 
from philosophers. More specifically, it could 
be seen as a philosophical contribution to the 
debate about decision-making under “grow-
ing awareness”, where the decision-maker 
knows that possible consequences that are 
currently unimaginable will be known once 
she has performed the action.3 In Paul’s cas-
es, the possibility that is currently unimagi-
nable is “what it would be like” or “how it 
would feel” to live a certain life (or a part 
thereof), and it is unimaginable because the 
agent has not yet had the experiences that 
would be part of this life. Once the agent has 
started to lead the life, she will know how it 
feels to live it. Paul lists many cases of this 
kind, some are small scale, others large scale; 
some are realistic, others unrealistic: eating a 
durian for the first time, eating vegemite for 
the first time, becoming a parent, becoming a 
vampire, becoming a doctor, joining a war, 
choosing to have a new sensory ability (sight 
or hearing). These transformative choices, as 
Paul calls them, will not only bring about rad-
ically different experiences, they will often 
also radically change our personality and 
preferences. Paul claims that such changes 
pose difficult but different challenges for ra-
tional decision-making. One challenge is that 
choices that result in changes to personality 
and preferences raise the question of which 
self to consult when making the choice: the 
self that exists prior to the transformation or 
the self that the transformation creates. 
When deliberating about whether to become 
a parent, should you consult your current and 
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career-driven self, or the family-oriented per-
son that you expect you will become after 
you have your child? 
Another problem with this radical change 
in experience, applied to the choice of be-
coming a parent, is this. Since one cannot, 
Paul thinks, know what it is like to be a par-
ent before one has actually experienced it, 
one can neither rationally decide to become a 
parent, nor decide to stay childfree, by “men-
tally simulating” the experience of being a 
parent. But such a simulation of what it 
would be like for one to experience being a 
parent is how one should approach this deci-
sion, according to the “predominant cultural 
paradigm”.4 According to this paradigm, 
when making a rational decision about 
whether to become a parent, one estimates 
the “subjective value” of experiencing the 
outcome of the choice to become a parent, 
and similarly for the experience of living a 
childfree life, and chooses the alternative that 
has the highest expectation of subjective val-
ue. But since one cannot know what it is like 
to be a parent before having had the experi-
ence of being one, one cannot assign this ex-
perience a subjective value. Hence, since a 
necessary condition for the possibility of 
making a rational choice in the situation in 
question is the ability to compare the subjec-
tive values of the two outcomes, one cannot 
rationally solve this decision-problem.5 
So how should one then make this life 
changing decision? Paul’s proposal is that 
when it comes to this and other transforma-
tive choices, we should “reformulate” or “re-
configure” the decision-problem so that it is 
seen as a choice between having and avoiding 
a revelation.6 In particular, we should frame 
the parenthood decision-problem in terms of 
whether we want to discover what parent-
hood would be like for us. But her solution 
can be applied to other cases too. When you 
consider the option of becoming a vampire, 
you should not frame the decision as involv-
ing a choice to realize the outcome described 
as what it is like to be a vampire, but as in-
volving a choice to realize an outcome de-
scribed as discovering what it is like to be a 
vampire.7 When you wonder whether to join 
the war, you should not ask yourself what it 
would be like to join the war; you should ask 
yourself whether you would want to discover 
what it is like to be a soldier. When you won-
der whether to become a doctor, you should 
not ask yourself what it would be like to be-
come a doctor; you should ask yourself 
whether you would want to discover what it is 
like to be a doctor. More specifically, you 
should ask yourself whether you think the 
revelation of what it is like to live these lives 
itself has subjective value (regardless of 
whether the revealed experiences themselves 
have any subjective value). By invoking this 
subjective revelatory value, you can now 
compare the outcome of a transformative 
experience to the status quo; and you can 
compare them without invoking any objec-
tive values. So, we have not strayed beyond, 
what Paul calls, “our cultural paradigm”.8 
In this short commentary, I shall focus on 
cases of epistemically transformative experi-
ences, as Paul calls them, cases where we have 
radically different experiences that teach us 
something we would not have learned other-
wise – what it would be like to lead a certain 
life. The reasons why I put aside cases of per-
sonally transformative experiences, where 
our personality and preferences change, is, 
first, that Paul says comparatively little about 
this problem and its solution and, second, 
that there already is a quite extensive litera-
ture on this problem, which Paul does not 
address.9 In contrast, Paul raises the new and 
rather intriguing question of whether epis-
temic transformative experiences pose a gen-
eral problem for the possibility of rational 
decision-making. I shall argue that there is an 
important grain of truth in Paul’s set up and 
solution when it is applied to a certain nar-
rowly defined set of cases – choices to have a 
new taste experience in a safe environment, 
where no important objective values are at 
stake. But the way she generalizes this ap-
proach to large-scale life choices, such as the 
choice to become a parent, is less convincing. 
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I should stress, however, that the book has 
many virtues. One is that, in contrast with 
the mainstream discussion about growing 
awareness, the discussion in Paul’s book pays 
close attention to vivid examples of growing 
awareness and the philosophical issues they 
generate. Another is the many interesting 
applications and extensions of her account. 
For example, she gives a very thoughtful dis-
cussion of the controversial question of 
whether deaf parents who have had a deaf 
child should opt to give their child an im-
plant that will restore the child’s hearing.10 
When we ponder whether to try durian 
for the first time, in a safe environment, 
knowing that eating it does not put any pru-
dential or moral values (or any other objec-
tive values) at risk, it seems sensible to be in-
terested only in how the fruit will taste. Since 
we cannot know in advance exactly how the 
fruit will taste – other people’s reports will 
provide limited or even conflicting infor-
mation – it is sensible to frame the choice as 
one between coming to know how durian 
tastes and not coming to know this. If you are 
curious, you will have a go and then add this 
experience to your collection of gustatory ex-
periences. This seems rational, since you pre-
fer knowing how it tastes to not knowing it 
and nothing else is at stake. The focus on the 
revelatory value of outcomes seems therefore 
to be justified in this kind of case. (Whether 
this value is “subjective” in Paul’s sense of the 
term is a different question, which we will 
come back to later). 
But large-scale life choices are not like 
gustatory choices in safe environments. First 
of all, as Paul herself stresses, large-scale 
choices will often be personally transforma-
tive since they bring about a change in your 
personality and fundamental preferences. 
But, second, putting this thorny issue aside, 
choosing to become a parent, join a war, be-
come a doctor, or become a vampire, is not 
like choosing to taste a durian, for these big-
ger life-choices involve many important pru-
dential and moral values and they are set in 
environments that are far from safe. A lot is 
at stake, both in terms of prudential and 
moral values, in joining a war or becoming a 
vampire. The war can be unjust and sucking 
blood out of humans is morally problematic 
to say the least. But even the choice to be-
come a parent can have drastic effects on 
one’s career possibilities. Important moral 
values can also be at stake. It is hardly moral-
ly indifferent to create a child who will live in 
a happy and loving relationship with you and 
others. Note also that creating a new life en-
ables a whole new branch of the family tree 
to be created; again, hardly something that is 
morally indifferent. Indeed, some have re-
cently argued that having an extra child is the 
choice that might have the greatest carbon 
footprint of all the individual choices we 
make in our life since this child might have a 
child, who might have a child, and so on for 
generations. 
Paul does, in fact, concede that large-scale 
life choices often involve important objective 
values, but she thinks that subjective values 
are still some of the most «central and im-
portant ones and an emphasis on them fits 
the dominant cultural paradigm». This par-
adigm says that we should approach many 
major life decisions «as personal matters 
where a central feature of what is at stake is 
what it will be like for us to experience the 
outcomes of our acts, and where the subjec-
tive value we assign to an outcome depends 
upon what we care about, whatever that 
might be».11 As I understand her, the cases 
where we should rely on subjective values are 
those in which objective values can be put 
aside (perhaps because the outcomes do not 
differ much in overall objective value). 
This means that her discussion risks hav-
ing quite a limited applicability since it is not 
clear that there are many cases left once we 
have excluded objective values. There do not 
seem to be many cases of life-changing deci-
sions in which we can sensibly say that we 
will chose to lead a certain life because we 
wanted to see what it would be like. “I chose 
to become a parent because I wanted know 
how it felt to be a parent”, “I chose to join the 
  Bykvist 
 
350 
war because I wanted to know how it felt to 
fight in a war”, and “I chose to become a 
vampire because I wanted to know how it felt 
to live as a vampire” are all statements that 
would sound frivolous and self-absorbed in 
most cases. In contrast, to say that we chose 
to try durian because we wanted to know 
how it tastes seems perfectly acceptable. 
The paradigm Paul alludes to sounds fa-
miliar if one thinks about how typical agents 
care about their own future pleasure or pain. 
We want to know what a future experience 
feels like so we can decide whether it will be 
pleasant or painful. But Paul has in mind 
something that goes beyond pleasure and 
pain. Subjective values, according to her, are 
not merely values of pleasure and pain. In-
stead, «they can be grounded by more than 
merely qualitative or sensory characteristics, 
as they may also arise from nonsensory phe-
nomenological features of experiences, espe-
cially rich, developed experiences that embed 
a range of mental states, including beliefs, 
emotions, and desires».12 One problem with 
this characterization of subjective values is 
that they are both supposed to “depend on” 
what we care about and be “grounded by” 
sensory and non-sensory phenomenological 
features. But it is not clear how we are sup-
posed to understand this double nature of 
subjective values. 
One option is that it is the agent’s re-
sponses that call the shots: an outcome (or a 
part thereof) has subjective value for an 
agent if and only if the agent cares about it in 
virtue of some of its sensory or non-sensory 
phenomenal features. The agent is not re-
quired to care about any particular phenom-
enal features. On this view, subjective value 
depends on what we care about, since if we 
do not care about an outcome it lacks value 
for us. Subjective value is also grounded in 
phenomenal features in the sense that if we 
care about an outcome in virtue of such fea-
tures, it has subjective value. The more the 
agent cares about it, the more subjective val-
ue it has, which can be, but need not be, a 
matter of the agent caring more when the in-
tensity of some phenomenal feature is great-
er. Since the phenomenal feature need not be 
sensory, the agent may care about the non-
sensory phenomenal features of finally dis-
covering how intense the taste of durian may 
be, assuming that these discoverings them-
selves have phenomenal features. So, discover-
ings can have subjective value for the agent. 
This response-dependent notion of sub-
jective values does not square well with other 
parts of Paul’s account, however. First, as ex-
plained above, Paul’s own solution to the 
problem of transformative choice is to assign 
subjective value to revelations, which, on the 
response-dependent model, means that the 
agent is simply assumed to care about the 
non-sensory phenomenal features of the dis-
covery of having a certain experience, not 
taking into account the phenomenological 
features of the experience itself, which are 
supposed to be unknown to her. But many 
normal agents do not care about such things 
(I myself being one). We must distinguish the 
phenomenological features of the objects of 
knowledge – the taste experience of eating a 
durian – from the phenomenological features 
of the knowledge state itself (without its ob-
ject). What is common is that people want to 
know how a certain culinary item tastes (a 
durian, for instance); but they do not care 
about how the knowledge of this experience 
itself feels. 
Of course, Paul could claim that even 
though we often do not in fact care about the 
phenomenological features of these epistemic 
states we are nevertheless rationally required 
to do so. But this is hardly part of our cultural 
paradigm of rational decision-making. After 
all, we do not teach our children to care 
about the phenomenological features of dis-
coveries as such. What we might do is to 
teach them to be more daring and explore 
various new taste experiences in safe envi-
ronments. Finally, there might not be any-
thing here for us to care about, since it is 
questionable whether these epistemic states 
themselves (without taking into account 
their objects) have any distinct phenomeno-
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logical features at all. 
Second, Paul’s claim that in order to know 
the subjective value of a future experience 
you must have already experienced it seems 
false, if the agent’s responses call the shots. In 
order to know its subjective value, you only 
need to know that you will respond to this 
experience on the basis of some of its phe-
nomenal features. You need not now know 
what these features are like. For example, in 
order to know that the experience of being a 
vampire will have subjective value for you, 
you do not need to know now what it is like 
to be a vampire; you only need to know that 
you will like the experience of being a vampire 
in virtue of some it is phenomenal features. 
It is true, as Paul repeatedly points out, 
that you may not know how or how strongly 
you will respond to your future experiences. 
You may not know whether you will like or 
dislike your vampire experiences, for exam-
ple. But this problem seems not to be of the 
same severity as the original one, and defi-
nitely of a different kind. Rational choice as 
Paul herself defines it, is about maximizing 
expected subjective value on the basis of evi-
dentially supported credences. In order to do 
this, we need to have an evidentially support-
ed credence distribution over alternative hy-
potheses about whether and how much your 
future self will like or dislike its experiences. 
The fact that the agent does not know which 
of these hypotheses will be true is not rele-
vant for the possibility of rational choice. 
The other interpretation of subjective 
value denies that the agent’s responses call 
the shots; phenomenological features of out-
comes can in their own right contribute to 
subjective value. At times, Paul says things 
that suggest this response-independent in-
terpretation. She claims, for instance, that 
the subjective value of the outcome of eating 
a durian is partially a matter of the phenom-
enal intensity of what it is like for you to taste 
a durian, and «so the magnitude of the posi-
tive or negative value is not just determined 
by the fact that the durian tastes good (or 
bad) to you, but by how intense your taste 
experience is».13 Similarly, when discussing 
the option of becoming a vampire, Paul 
claims that it is possible that the phenomenal 
intensity of the experience of becoming a 
vampire will swamp the phenomenal intensi-
ty of the experiences in other outcomes.14 
This is a very controversial view of value, 
to say the least, and is hardly part of our cul-
tural paradigm about how to assess possible 
lives. It is not even part of the cultural para-
digm about how to assess wines. Not even 
wine connoisseurs, who think that there are 
wines that we ought to like even if we do not 
find them at all pleasing, think that this value 
is improved whenever some aspect of the 
tasting experience becomes more intense. 
The best wine is not the one with the most 
intense acidity, sweetness, and tannins. What 
matters most is the balance of the wine – how 
the various taste elements come together. 
Paul could reply by saying that the wine 
example I gave is close to what she had in 
mind, except that we should consider non-
sensory phenomenal features as well, and 
that it was therefore a mistake to focus on 
the sheer intensity of experiences. The idea 
would then be that an outcome (or a part 
thereof) has subjective value for an agent if 
and only if the agent cares about it in virtue 
of a certain combination (possibly very com-
plex) of sensory and non-sensory phenome-
nal features. These features go beyond pain 
and pleasure, likes and dislikes, and it is not 
just a matter of the intensity of the features. 
It is not up to the agent to decide which fea-
tures those are and what the right combina-
tion is. 
Again, it is very doubtful that this is part 
of our cultural paradigm about how to assess 
outcomes, however. It is true, as Paul points 
out, that we often use “mental simulation” in 
deliberations, whereby we project ourselves 
into our possible future outcomes and try to 
assess “what they would be like”. But, typical-
ly, we do this in order to predict how we 
would act, react, and how much pleasure and 
pain we would feel. It would be reading far 
too much into this method to understand it 
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as a way of identifying some complex combi-
nation of phenomenal properties, which are 
supposed to go beyond pain and pleasure and 
our likes and dislikes, that in part makes the 
outcome valuable. At least, this use of the 
method is not typical. It would only be useful 
for texture fetishists, who think that the expe-
riential texture itself, independently of 
whether it is painful or pleasant, liked or dis-
liked, contributes to the value of outcomes. 
They deserve the name “fetishist” since even 
if such a person were to consult a crystal ball 
that informed him exactly how happy and 
wealthy he will be if he becomes a parent, 
how it will affect his career, how pleasant or 
unpleasant it will be, how happy the child will 
be, and so on, he would not be able to assess 
the outcome of being a parent, since he still 
lacks information about the exact texture of 
becoming a parent. I think it is safe to say that 
such persons are rare, and also that there is not 
a general rational requirement to become one.15 
Even if I am wrong about this, this inter-
pretation of subjective values seems to make 
Paul’s own solution problematic. Note that 
even on this interpretation, subjective value 
depends in part on what we care about, but 
that means that bringing in the subjective 
value of revelation is no solution if the agent 
happens not to care about how revelations 
feel. So, we are back to the problem of having 
to insist that we are rationally required to 
care about how revelations feel. Further-
more, since subjective value is in part defined 
by some combination of phenomenal proper-
ties and it is not up to the agent to decide 
what this combination will be, we need to 
know the phenomenal features that in part 
make revelations valuable. But what are they 
and how can we know them? 
Finally, if we go for this account of subjec-
tive value, there does not seem to be any 
need to bring in the subjective value of reve-
lations. After all, when we are purchasing 
wine so that we can enjoy a good wine but 
don’t have the ability to taste it in advance, it 
seems very sensible to rely on the advice of 
wine connoisseurs whose judgements we 
trust and who know what kinds of wine we 
tend to enjoy. They might of course disagree 
among themselves, but we can still consider 
various hypotheses regarding who is likely to 
be right, and give more credence to the ones 
we trust more. The same approach could be 
used for life choices, assuming with Paul that 
they are similar to wine choices. 
The main upshots of this are that (a) on 
both interpretations, Paul has to assume that 
we are rationally required to care about the 
phenomenal feel of revelations of experiences, 
which seems very implausible and definitely 
not part of our cultural paradigm about ra-
tional decision-making, and that (b) on nei-
ther interpretation of subjective value will the 
agent necessarily be stuck in her decision-
making for she can entertain different hy-
potheses about subjective value without hav-
ing to have experienced those values herself. 
Paul would resist (b), partly because she 
thinks that the agent will not be able to as-
sign epistemically reasonable credences to 
these hypotheses about subjective value. 
Since the agent cannot rely on first-hand 
knowledge of the experience, she has to rely 
on third-personal information. Paul points 
out, however, that relying on third-personal 
information is problematic because there 
might not be any robust information to go 
by.16 Paul is surely right to remind us about 
this problem, but some pieces of information 
can be better than none. Take the example of 
parenthood. While she might be right in 
claiming that one cannot know for sure how 
parenthood will affect one’s desires and be-
liefs,17 one can at least form informed expec-
tations by talking to those who have already 
gone through the transformation and by 
reading the relevant empirical literature.18 
The same can be said about the impact of 
parenthood on career prospects and happi-
ness (or subjective well-being). Paul is, of 
course, correct in pointing out that these sta-
tistics won’t tell anyone for sure how happy 
they will be as a parent (or what that happi-
ness or misery will “feel like”), or how it will 
affect their career. But by complimenting da-
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ta about the average effects on people suffi-
ciently similar to oneself with information 
gained by asking people one trusts how 
parenthood affected them – and, perhaps more 
importantly, why it affected them the way it did 
– one can certainly form informed and reason-
able expectations about the effects parenthood 
will have on one’s career and subjective well-
being. These expectations can then help one 
decide whether one’s desires are best served by 
becoming a parent or by remaining childfree. 
In any case, much more needs to be said to 
show that this problem makes it impossible to 
have epistemically reasonable credences about 
your future subjective values. 
Paul has another argument against relying 
on third-personal information, namely, that 
it would threaten our autonomy or authentic-
ity as agents. She gives the example of Sally, 
who has always believed that having a child 
will make her happy and fulfilled, but decides 
not to have a child just because empirical ev-
idence suggests that remaining childless 
would maximize her expected subjective 
well-being.19 Paul claims that her choice 
would be “bizarre” and that she would be 
«giving up autonomy for the sake of ration-
ality».20 It is not clear why Paul thinks this. If 
Sally wants to have a child because she be-
lieves that it would make her happy and max-
imize her expected subjective well-being and 
is informed that having a child would not 
maximize her expected subjective well-being, 
why would it be bizarre and a sacrifice of au-
tonomy for her to choose to remain childless? 
She is just making use of relevant empirical 
information to make a choice on the basis of 
her preference for happiness and future sub-
jective values. As Paul herself points out, “ra-
tional authenticity” is about making the best 
decisions one can in order to fulfil ones 
dreams and aspirations21 and that is exactly 
what Sally is doing by making use of relevant 
empirical information. Paul must have in 
mind a very different Sally, one that has no 
prior preference about whether to have a 
child but decides to remain childless just be-
cause some social scientist told her to, where 
the social scientist thinks she should not have 
a child because it would not maximize her 
expected subjective well-being. That would 
be a rather bizarre behaviour and also a sacri-
fice of autonomy, but this would of course go 
way beyond making use of third-personal 
empirical evidence – it would be to give 
someone else control over your future. 
Another problem for response-involving 
subjective values, whether the responses call 
the shots or not, is that it seems that we can 
have conflicts between responses. As Paul 
points out, my response now towards a fu-
ture experience, which I already know first-
hand (or the response I would now have if I 
knew the experience first-hand), need not 
agree with my future response towards the 
same future experience.22 I am not sure this is 
a major problem, however, if we put aside 
cases where our fundamental preferences 
change, for this means that we are not talking 
about conflicts of ideals here, only conflicts 
between responses towards the “feel and fla-
vour” of a certain life in cases where we can 
safely put aside important objective values 
such as moral and prudential values. But 
normal agents do not seem to have uncondi-
tional attitudes towards the feel and flavour 
of their lives when no important values are at 
stake. For example, now being a fermented 
cabbage lover, I favour my future experience 
of eating fermented cabbage on the condition 
that I will later still favour it. To use Parfit’s 
term, these favourings are conditional on 
their own persistence. In contrast, when my 
favouring expresses an ideal, I favour being 
honest, healthy, and prudent in the future 
even if I will later lack any concern for these 
things. Something like this distinction is im-
plicitly assumed in the old joke “It is a good 
thing I do not like fermented cabbage be-
cause if I did I would eat something I hate”. 
So far, I have questioned Paul’s use of 
subjective values in rational decision-making. 
But let us now assume that Paul is right about 
the following things: (a) rational choice, in 
many life choice cases, has to do with maxim-
izing expected subjective value, (b) we need 
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to know first-hand the phenomenal features 
of an experience in order to know its subjec-
tive value, (c) revelations have their own 
phenomenology. Even if these controversial 
claims are granted, it is still not clear that her 
own solution works. Remember that the idea 
is to invoke the subjective value of revela-
tions. But in order to do this the agent needs 
to already know this subjective value. Oth-
erwise the reframing of the decision situation 
in terms of revelations would be of no use. 
But if I have not yet had a certain experience, 
how can I know how it feels to have the reve-
lation of that experience? If I do not know 
how it feels to have the revelation, I do not 
know its subjective value and we are back 
where we started. 
There are two main responses Paul could 
make. She could say that the phenomenology 
of revelation is to a sufficiently large extent 
invariant with the object of the revelation. 
However, it is difficult to see why this must 
be true. For example, at least to me who has 
tried both, coming to know how vegemite 
tastes seems phenomenologically quite dif-
ferent from coming to know what it is like to 
be a parent. Indeed, it is difficult for Paul to 
deny this possible variance, since she adopts 
an expansive account of phenomenology, ac-
cording to which the phenomenology of an 
experience may depend on its content. So two 
epistemic experiences with very different con-
tents – i.e., coming to know very different ex-
periences – cannot be assumed to have the 
same phenomenology.23 But if this cannot be 
assumed, nothing is gained in terms of helping 
the agent decide, for instance, whether to have 
a child or not, by reformulating the choice as 
one between having or foregoing the experi-
ence of the revelation in question. For just as 
he cannot determine the subjective value of 
being a parent, so he cannot determine the 
subjective value of experiencing the revelation 
that parenthood brings with it.24 
The other response is to say that the phe-
nomenology is different but argue that there 
are crucial phenomenological similarities be-
tween the revelations of very different expe-
riences. Even if the subjective value of revela-
tions is somehow grounded in their intrinsic 
phenomenal features, they need not be 
grounded in all such features. So, in order to 
know the relevant aspects of the experience 
of a certain revelation, you need not have had 
this experience in all its phenomenal detail 
and richness. You only need to know what 
this experience is like in certain respects, 
which you might already have encountered 
in the revelatory experiences you have al-
ready had. With this knowledge, you can ex-
trapolate from your past experience to the 
new future experience. But exactly the same 
move could be made for the experiences that 
are the objects of the revelation. Not all phe-
nomenal features of becoming a parent are 
relevant for its subjective value; only some 
are. Perhaps in order to (at least roughly) as-
sess the subjective value of parenthood it is 
enough to have had experiences of sleep dep-
rivation, strong attachment, love, and devo-
tion towards a vulnerable person. Indeed, 
Paul herself suggests this kind of move in her 
Afterword when she talks about the choice to 
become a vampire. One can then wonder 
why we need to bring in the subjective value 
of revelations if it is conceded that we can 
roughly assess the subjective value of the ex-
periences that would be revealed by our 
transformative choice. We need an argument 
that shows that it is easier to identify the sub-
jective value of revelations than to do same 
for the experiences that are the objects of 
these revelations. 
Of course, these problems would all dis-
appear if we simply denied that the experi-
ence of the revelation must have value. In-
stead we could say that whether a certain 
revelation has value depends on whether the 
agent wants to know what it feels like to live a 
certain life – i.e., to decide whether or not 
she wants to be in a particular epistemic state. 
This way of understanding revelatory value 
seems to mesh much better with how we 
speak. When we are curious about how a du-
rian tastes, we say that we want to know how 
it tastes, but we do not say that we want to 
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know this because we care about how it feels 
to know how it tastes. There are many differ-
ent reasons for why we want to know how it 
tastes. Many are instrumental: we want to 
know how it tastes because we think it is like-
ly we will like it, or we want to know this so 
we can tell others to try it if it tastes good 
(and we assume others have the same tastes), 
or we want to know how it tastes, even if it 
tastes awful, because we want to be seen as 
gustatory daredevils. But we could also just be 
interested in collecting pieces of knowledge of 
taste experiences, independently of whether it 
tastes good or bad. This account of revelatory 
value would be a radical break from Paul’s 
framework, however. 
First, this option goes against the “cultur-
al paradigm” Paul adopts, namely that we 
should make decisions by performing mental 
simulations about what the future would be 
like experientially in all details, going beyond 
future pleasures and pains, and future likes 
and dislikes. To ask the agent to decide 
whether they prefer to be in a certain epis-
temic state or not is not to ask her to imagine 
how things would be like in all their experi-
ential details. 
Second, the agent Paul had in mind cares 
only about subjective values and thus gets 
stuck in cases of transformative choices. But 
the agent we now imagine cares (intrinsically 
or instrumentally) about knowing what some-
thing is like, even though she denies that this 
revelation itself has any subjective value. She 
might even deny that the object of the revela-
tion can be subjectively good: “I know the 
taste will be pretty awful, but I want to show 
others I can take it”. 
Third, since, unlike the texture fetishist, 
the agent we imagine is not stuck with values 
that can only be known by first-hand experi-
ence, she does not face the problem Paul 
starts off with: the problem of not knowing 
the feel and flavor of the alternative out-
comes and therefore not knowing how to as-
sess them. She faces instead the more familiar 
problem of trading the revelatory value of 
new experiences (“Do I want to know how it 
tastes?”, “Do I want to know how it feels to 
live like that?”) against objective values, such 
as morality and prudence (“Is it OK to eat 
it?”, “Is it OK to live like that?”). To do this 
sensibly she needs to first figure out whether 
she cares about knowing a new experience 
for its own sake or for the sake of other 
things she cares about. If it is the latter, she 
needs to assess the likelihoods that the reve-
lation will bring about the things she cares 
about for their own sake. Again, this is a fa-
miliar problem for all kinds of values the 
agent considers. The important point is that, 
for this agent, who I think is not unlike many 
of us, there is no need to reconfigure the 
choice situation. The revelation of new expe-
riences is already one of the intrinsic or in-
strumental values she considers. 
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